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Abstract 
We present a model that offers an explanation whether a condition is attached to cash transfers 
affects the elimination of child labor, taking into account wealth heterogeneity (especially land).  
The cash transfer program designs (conditional vs. unconditional) is determined through a 
political process.  We show that when wealth distribution is left-skewed, median voters 
support conditional cash transfers, which reduces child labor.  Unconditional cash transfers 
enjoy political support when the wealth distribution is less skewed; however, child labor 
remains.  Our cross-country estimation confirms that countries with a greater wealth 
inequality are adopted conditional cash transfer in a number of developing and transition 
economies.  The effects of sibling differences on child labor and cash transfer programs are also 
examined.   
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1. Introduction 
Over the last several decades, the governments of developing and transitional countries have 
implemented the cash transfer (CT) programs that focus on poverty and inequality alleviation.  
It is well-known that CT programs may be conditional or unconditional; conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) transfer cash to poor households on the condition that the recipients meet 
certain requirements, while unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) provide benefits to all eligible 
beneficiaries.  Since Mexico’s pioneering PROGRESA (renamed Oportunidades) was launched 
in 1997, CCTs have become one of the most popular programs for reducing inequality, especially 
in the very unequal countries in Latin America (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).1  Today, CCTs have 
become the main social assistance intervention in developing and transitional economies, being 
implemented in 64 countries as of 2014 (World Bank, 2015).  Despite the success of CCTs in 
some Latin America and the Caribbean, many CT programs in sub-Saharan Africa in force since 
2000 have been unconditional, so as to focus on extremely poor.2  Gaader (2012) points out 
that UCTs have been adopted in sub-Saharan Africa rather than CCTs due to the lack of public 
services in the poor areas of several African countries. 3   The debate over whether 
conditionality should be attached to cash transfers has continued to be one of the most 
important issues in developing economies (see, for example, Schubert and Slater, 2006; Baird et 
al., 2011; Davis et al., 2012; Gaader, 2012; Garcia et al., 2012).  Behrman and Skoufias (2006) 
suggest that CCTs are not necessarily superior to UCTs although they demonstrate the positive 
impacts of the CCTs on poverty and human development outcomes.4  Experimental evidence 
from Malawi has also shows that conditions may be relevant for certain, but not all, cash 
transfers directly comparing the effects of UCTs to CCTs (Baird et al., 2011).5  Recently, using 
data from 75 reports that cover 35 different studies, Baird et al., (2014) find that the effects of 
CCTs are always larger than those of UCTs in relation to school enrolment and attendance, but 
                                                                
1  Fiszbein and Schady (2009) provide the first comprehensive report of CCTs, which have 
become popular in developing countries over the last decade.  This review confirms with much 
evidence that CCTs have been effective in reducing poverty and expanding access to education 
and health services in developing countries.    
2 Garcia et al., (2012) mention that CCTs also have also relatively increased, reaching in 13 
countries in 2010 (p.46).  They report that 5 countries have only had CCTs, and 21 countries 
have only had UCTs.  In addition, they note that 9 countries have had both CCTs and UCTs.   
3 See, several papers, including Gaader (2012) in “Conditional versus unconditional cash: a 
commentary” in the Journal of Development Effectiveness 4 (1), 2012.   
4 Using the data from the PROGRESA randomized experiment, Schultz (2004), Behrman et al., 
(2005), Todd and Wolpin (2006), De Janvry et al., (2006) and Attanasio et al., (2012) 
demonstrate that CCTs have a positive impact on education outcomes.  
5 So far, studies directly comparing CCTs to UCTs have been conducted in four countries (i.e., 
Burkina Faso, Malawi, Morocco and Zimbabwe).  Focusing on the education component, Akresh 
et al., (2013) conduct a randomized experiment in rural Burkina Faso.  Their results indicate 
that both CCTs and UCTs have a similar impact in increasing children’s enrollment.  
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the difference is not statistically significant.  A key question to ask may be whether the impacts 
of CCTs on various outcomes－household consumption, and savings; education, health and 
nutrition; labor force participation－exceeds that of UCTs.  Therefore, in this study, we consider 
the role of conditionality in the endogenous policy choice between CCTs and UCTs for CT 
programs to eliminate child labor.  
Child labor has continued to fall worldwide; however, the pace of decline slowed 
considerably in the 2012 and 2016, especially in Africa (ILO, 2017).  Their estimation also 
confirmed that, as shown by Edmonds and Pavckip (2005), most working children are at home, 
helping their family by assisting in the family business or farm as well as with domestic work.  
So far many authors have empirically studied the linkage between CCTs/UCTs programs and 
child labor.6  However, when focusing on the (family) farm work, the research provides mixed 
results (see, for example, De Hoop and Rosati (2014) for an excellent survey).  Under CCT 
schemes, Skoufias et al., (2001) demonstrate that CCTs like PROGRESA do not have an impact on 
hours devoted to farm work for children aged 12-15, but do reduce market work among boys in 
this age group.  By contrast, using data from Mexico’s PROGRESA, Doran (2013) finds that CCTs 
result in large decreases in children’s participation in farm work, thereby leading to have positive 
impacts on adult wages and employment.  Under UCT schemes, Covarrubias et al., (2012) 
found that UCTs like the SCT in Malawi generate agricultural asset investments, leading to 
greater participation by children in family farm/non-farm business activities.  Our theoretical 
framework attempts to provide insights to explain this mixed evidence.    
For our purpose, we use an overlapping generations model à la Basu et al., (2010) who 
demonstrate the inverted-U relationship between wealth (especially landholding) and child 
labor.  Empirical evidence shows that possession of land and livestock is associated with higher 
levels of child labor (Goulart and Bedi, 2008).7   Since the seminal paper by Bhalotra and Heady 
(2003) showing that the children of landed households are often more likely to work than those 
of landless households, known as ‘the wealth paradox’, empirical findings similar to the wealth 
paradox have been obtained in several sub-Saharan African countries (e.g., for Brukina Faso, 
Dumas, 2007; for Etiopia, Cockburn and Dostie, 2007; for Cameroon, Friebel et al., 2015; for 
                                                                
6 Skoufias et al., (2001) and Edmonds and Schady (2012) show that PROGRESA had a clear 
negative impact on child labor.  Using the data of Bolsa Escola, Bourguignon et al., (2003) and 
Cardoso and Souza (2004) show that CCTs were critical and successful in increasing school 
participation, and UCTs would have no impact on child labor.  In contrast, using the data of child 
support grant in South Africa, empirical evidence shows that UCTs improve schooling outcomes 
among children, along with other outcomes (see, for example, Duflo, 2003).     
7 Webbink et al., (2012) demonstrate that the possessing land increases the probability that 
children are engaged in family business work, but other forms of wealth generally reduce the 
number of hours children work in Africa.  Children’s involvement in both forms of child labor 
is substantially increased if the household has land, thus confirming the labor intensity of 
(family) farm work.    
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Zimbabwe, Oryoie et al., 2007; for Tanzania, Kafle et al., 2018).  This study investigates the link 
between landholding and child labor in deciding whether to attach condition to cash transfers.8 
This study also attempts to capture the effect of conditioning cash transfers on the political 
economy.  When focusing on the relationship between child labor policy and inequality, some 
political economy models provide interesting insights into child labor, endogenously explaining 
why some countries have child labor policies and others do not (Basu and Tzannatos, 2003).  
Following Basu and Tzannatos (2003), there are two kinds of policy interventions: coercive 
measures and collaborative measures.  In coercive measures, such as a ban on child labor, 
Doepke and Zillibotti (2002) endogenize child labor regulations (in the form of a ban on child 
labor) and demonstrate that households with many children and less wealth tend to oppose legal 
restrictions on child labor, calibrated to fit Great Britain’s experience in the 19th century.  In 
collaborative measures, Gelbach and Pritchett (2002) show that an increase in the degree of 
targeting transfer to the poor reduces the social welfare of three groups (low income, middle 
income and rich, when both the transfer and tax are determined by majority voting.  In 
Bangladesh’s the Food for Education program, Galasso and Ravallion (2005) use a collective 
model to capture distributional conflict within communities and demonstrate that villages with 
more unequal land distribution were worse at targeting transfer to the poor.  Their result is 
consistent with the view that there is a strong association between land inequality and less 
power for the poor.  Recently, Estevan (2013) examines the impact of CCTs on the level of public 
education expenditures chosen by majority voting, and demonstrates that CCTs increases the 
income of the pivotal voter, leading to an increase in education quality.  However, in 
collaborative measures, most standard theories of the political decision on redistribution do not 
consider the incidence of child labor.  In our setting, the government’s child labor policies that 
decide whether to attach condition to cash transfers are determined by majority voting.  
The results of this study are as follows.  When wealth distribution is more skewed to the 
left, CCTs tends to be supported by median voter, leading to a reduction in child labor.  In an 
economy where the wealth paradox holds, households with small amounts of land are less likely 
to send their children to work.  Thus, they do not suffere from the introduction of CT programs 
that impose a penalty for child labor.  If there are many landless households, the majority may 
support CCTs in selecting between CCTs and UCTs for CT programs.  This result is consistent 
with the fact that CCTs tends to be preferred in the very unequal countries (Fiszbein and Schady, 
2009).  In contrast, UCTs tends to have political support when the wealth distribution is less 
                                                                
8 As pointed out by Oryoie et al., (2013), the relationship between child labor and land holdings 
is complex.  Land has two opposing effects on child work; one is substitution effect, where the 
amount of land affects the incentives for putting children to work on the farm.  The other is an 
income effect, where more land holdings are associated with higher incomes, which decreases 
the demand for child work.    
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skewed across individuals, but child labor continues to prevail.  Our results highlight the 
importance of accounting for the wealth (land) distribution inequalities that affect the 
endogenous policy choice between CCTs and UCTs for CT programs, and thus the resulting 
prevalence of child labor.  Since the key parameters that determine whether a condition is 
attached to cash transfers are the median and the average wealth, we can estimate the preferred 
index which explains the relevance of CT programs in the choice between CCTs and UCTs, using 
data presented by Davies et al., (2017).  Our cross-country estimation confirms that countries 
with greater wealth inequality adopt CCTs in a number of developing and transition economies.     
Second, we show that in countries with more siblings, UCTs are adopted rather than CCTs.  
Our theoretical result is consistent with recent empirical evidences in developing and transition 
economies that children born earlier are more likely to work than siblings born later.9  CCTs 
with one specific child may lead parents to reallocate child work away from the recipient and 
toward other children in the household.  Evidence of this effect has been found in Colombia 
(Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011).  We also show that when the age gap among siblings is introduced, 
a narrowed age gap induces earlier-born children to work more, but later-born siblings to work 
ambiguously.  This theoretical result is consistent with empirical findings in Nepal by Edmonds 
(2007), in Brazil by Emerson and Souza (2008), and in Cambodia by Ferreira et al., (2017). 
   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The basic model is presented in Section 
2 and analyzed in Section 3.  In Section 4, the basic model is specified to analytically investigate 
the effects of on child labor, while several extensions of our basic model are presented in Section 
5.  Section 6 presents the results of some cross-country calibrations, and Section 7 offers some 
conclusions.   
 
 
2. The Model 
Our analysis is based on Basu et al., (2010), and incorporates the wealth heterogeneity of 
individuals.  Consider a small open overlapping generations model that consists of individuals 
with two-period lives (childhood and parenthood), where the government implements CT 
programs.  In our basic model, children are assumed to work on the family farm.  This 
assumption means that there is no market as such for child labor (Bar and Basu, 2009; Basu et 
al., 2010).    
      
2.1 Individuals       
                                                                
9 In Latin America and Caribean, see Dammert (2010) for Nicaragua and Guatemala; De Haan 
et al., (2014) for Ecuador.  In sub-Saharan Africa, see, Kazeem (2010) for Nigeria; Alvi and 
Dendir (2011) for Ethiopia; Moshoeshoe (2016) for Lesotho; Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) for 
16 Sub-Saharan African countries.    
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Each household owns land, and the land size is denoted by 𝑘.  The distribution of 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is 
denoted by a probability distribution function 𝐹(𝑘).  We assume the distribution is skewed to 
the left, that is, the median land size, 𝑘𝑚, is smaller than the average, ?̅?, 𝑘𝑚 < ?̅?.      
Each household has one parent and one child (this assumption is relaxed in section 5 to 
examine the effects of sibling differences on child labor).  Each parent supplies one unit of labor 
inelastically, and each child has one unit of time that has to be divided among work, 𝑒 , and 
leisure, 1 − 𝑒.  He/She supplies 𝑒 unit of labor, which depends on the land size, 𝑘.  His/Her 
leisure (child nonwork) is assumed to be a luxury good (Basu et al., 2010). 
   The utility function is assumed to be linear utility function of the form: 
 𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑒) = 𝑐 − 𝜙(𝑒), (1) 
where 𝑐 is the consumption in parenthood; 𝑒 is the child labor.  We also assume that the 
marginal disutility of child labor is positive and increasing: 
 𝜙′ > 0, 𝜙′′ > 0.  
Since production takes place using both adult and child labor, and the household consumes 
what it produces due to no labor market, the household budget constraint can be written as   
 𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒) + ?̃? = (1 + 𝜏)𝑐, (2) 
where 𝑓(∙) is the household’s production function.  1 + 𝑒 is the total labor supply of adult plus 
child, which means the adult works full time while child is represented by 𝑒.  ?̃? represents the 
CT programs (see below for further detail), and 𝜏 is the consumption tax rate.   
The technology of household production is assumed to be 
 𝑓𝑘 > 0, 𝑓𝑒 > 0, 𝑓𝑘𝑘 ≤ 0, 𝑓𝑒𝑒 ≤ 0, 𝑓𝑒𝑘 > 0,  
The condition 𝑓𝑒𝑘 > 0 implies land is a complement to labor in the sense that greater land 
increases labor’s productivity.   
 
2.2 Cash transfer programs 
The government is assumed to be implemented the following CT program: 
 ?̃? = 𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒, (3) 
where 𝑇(> 0)  is a transfer that is not dependent on type and 𝑝(≥ 0)  is an index of 
conditionality.10   When 𝑝 = 0, the CT program is called ‘unconditional cash transfers’ (UCTs) 
program.  When 𝑝 > 0,  the program is called “conditional cash transfers” (CCTs) program.  
Specification Eq. (3) implies that if poor parents send their children to work as child labor, the 
penalty (captured by 𝑝), to prevent their children from working is imposed by the government.  
This specification of CT program is motivated by Garcia et al., (2012), who mention that the 
                                                                
10 This setting is common in the welfare state literature.  See, for example, Casamatta et al., 
(2000), Fenge and Meier (2005), Borck (2007), Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007), Cremer et al., 
(2007), Galasso and Profeta (2007) and Cigno (2008).    
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condition used in sub-Sahara Africa’s CCTs include avoidance of child labor (p.119).11  For 
example, in 2012, Ghana expanded its cash transfer program, LEAP, which makes monetary 
grants to households conditioned upon the children attending school and not engaging in child 
labor.  Another example is Brazil’s PETI (Programa de Erradicaçao do Trabalho Infantil) 
program, which required participation in an after-school program in order to discourage child 
labor.  Early evaluations suggest that this program is successful in reducing children’s time 
spent working (Cardoso and Souza, 2004; Yap et al., 2009).   
  
2.3 Utility maximization problem 
Substituting Eqs. (2) and (3) into Eq. (1), the utility maximization problem can be written as   
  
 
max 
𝑒
𝑢 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒) + 𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒] − 𝜙(𝑒). 
 
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition requires  
 𝑓𝑒 (𝑘, 1 + 𝑒) + 𝑇 − 𝑝 = (1 + 𝜏)𝜙
′ (𝑒). (4) 
Eq. (4) gives 𝑒 = 𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏).  Making use of Eq. (4), it follows that 
 𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑘
=
𝑓𝑒𝑘
(1 + 𝜏)𝜙′′ − 𝑓𝑒𝑒
> 0, (5a) 
 𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑝
= −
1
(1 + 𝜏)𝜙′′ − 𝑓𝑒𝑒
< 0, (5b) 
 𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝜏
= −
𝜙′
(1 + 𝜏)𝜙′′ − 𝑓𝑒𝑒
< 0. (5c) 
It should be noted that from Eq. (5a), an increase in wealth (landholdings) causes the marginal 
product of child labor to rise, and hence child labor increase.  This result is consistent with 
recent empirical findings (the so-called the wealth paradox described in Introduction).  As can 
be seen from Eq. (5b), the higher the index share, the less his/her child labor.  Eq. (5c) shows 
that an increase in tax rate reduces child labor.   
From Eq. (2), household consumption is given by 
 
𝑐 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)) + 𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)] = 𝑐(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏). (6) 
 
2.4 Government 
The government budget constraint is given by  
                                                                
11 The same condition has been used in several countries.  See, for example, U.S. Embassy 
(2015).     
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𝜏 ∫ 𝑐(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) = ∫ ?̃?
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘). (7) 
Substituting Eqs. (3) and (6) into Eq. (7), we obtain the uniform transfer as a function of (𝑝, 𝜏), 
 
𝑇 = 𝜏 ∫ 𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏))
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) + 𝑝 ∫ 𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) ≡ 𝑇(𝑝, 𝜏). (8) 
 
 
3. Voting Equilibrium 
In this section we characterize the voting equilibrium where households decide whether the 
CT programs will be CCTs or UCTs.  The policy parameter 𝑝  is determined endogenously 
through majority voting among parents, taking the tax rate, 𝜏, as given.12  We first derive the 
objective function of households in the voting process.  Taking Eq. (8) into account and 
substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (1) yields the voter’s problem of determining the preferred index 𝑝.  
The indirect utility of household 𝑘 is  
 
𝑢∗ =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)) + 𝑇(𝑝, 𝜏) − 𝑝𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)] − 𝜙(𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)). (9) 
Differentiating 𝑢∗  with respect to 𝑝, 
 𝜕𝑢∗
𝜕𝑝
=
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑓𝑒
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑝
+ 𝑇𝑝 (𝑝, 𝜏) − 𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏) − 𝑝
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑝
] − 𝜙′
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑝
.  
Making use of Eq. (4), we obtain  
 𝜕𝑢∗
𝜕𝑝
=
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑇𝑝 (𝑝, 𝜏) − 𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)]. (10) 
Denoted by 𝑝∗ = 𝑝(𝑘, 𝜏),  then, the preferred index 𝑝∗  for household, 𝑘, would then be given 
by 
 𝑇𝑝 (𝑝
∗ , 𝜏) = 𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝∗ , 𝜏). (11) 
Eq. (11) states that marginal benefit (MB) of increasing in the index share, 𝑝, is equal to the 
marginal cost (MC).  We need  
 𝑇𝑝𝑝(𝑝
∗ , 𝜏) − 𝑒𝑝 (𝑘, 𝑝
∗ , 𝜏) < 0, (12) 
for all (𝑘, 𝜏).   
   Differentiating Eq. (10) with respect to 𝑘, we obtain 
 𝜕2 𝑢∗
𝜕𝑝𝜕𝑘
= −
1
1 + 𝜏
𝑒𝑘 (𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏). (13) 
Because 𝑒𝑘 > 0,  the cross derivative Eq. (13) is always negative, which satisfies the single-
crossing property.   
                                                                
12 We only study one-dimensional voting here because we want to abstract from all the issues 
with non-existence that arise in two-dimensional voting.  See, for example, Bearse et al., (2000).  
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   The optimal voting behavior can be interpreted as follows: The right-hand side of Eq. (11), 
𝑒(𝑘, 𝑝∗ , 𝜏), is the marginal cost of an increase in the index share, which leads to reducing 𝑒  
units of income, and thus decreases household utility.   
From Eq. (8), the impact of the index share on the uniform transfer is given by 
 
𝑇𝑝 (𝑝, 𝜏) = ∫ [𝑒 + (𝜏𝑓𝑒 + 𝑝)𝑒𝑝 ]
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘). (14) 
Note that from Eq. (14), the left-hand side of Eq. (11), 𝑇𝑝 (𝑝
∗ , 𝜏), represents the marginal 
benefit which is composed of three effects.  One is the direct substitute effect, which is positive.  
When tax rate is constant, an increase in the index share brings an increase of ∫ 𝑒𝐾 𝑑𝐹(𝑘) .  
Thus, the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (14) represents the direct effect of substituting 
from the child labor related component to the uniform transfer.  By contrast, when the index 
shares increase, child labor declines, and in response to this, the marginal benefit decreases 
through two channels; one is the tax effect which is negative.  Reducing child labor leads to a 
decrease in household production, leading to a reduction in consumption and the resulting tax 
revenue.  Then, the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (14) is ∫ 𝜏𝑓𝑒 𝑒𝑝𝐾 𝑑𝐹(𝑘) < 0.  
The second channel is the indirect effect that substitutes from the child labor related component 
to the uniform transfer.  Reducing child labor causes a decrease in the child labor related 
component.  The third term on the right side of Eq. (14) is  ∫ 𝑝𝑒𝑝𝐾 𝑑𝐹(𝑘) < 0.   
   It should be noted that greater wealth (larger landholding) leads to a reduction in the 
preferred index share.  From Eq. (11), and making use of Eqs. (4) and (12), we obtain the 
following result:  
 𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑘
=
𝑒𝑘 (𝑘, 𝑝, 𝜏)
𝑇𝑝𝑝(𝑝
∗ , 𝜏) − 𝑒𝑝 (𝑘, 𝑝
∗ , 𝜏)
< 0.  
This indicates that wealthier households tend to prefer UCTs rather than CCTs.   
Now, we concentrate on the voting equilibrium, where the median voter chooses the 
preferred index, 𝑝∗  .  Denote the land size of the median household by 𝑘𝑚 .  Then, the 
preferred index in the voting equilibrium, denoted by 𝑝𝑚, is given as a function of (𝑘𝑚, 𝜏): 
 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝(𝑘𝑚, 𝜏). (15) 
To obtain further insights into the effects of wealth inequality on child labor, we specify our 
model in Section 4.   
 
 
4. Specification 
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In this section we specify our model to analytically solve the voting equilibrium.  We set the 
disutility of child labor, 
 
𝜙(𝑒) =
𝑒2
2𝑎
. (16) 
A smaller 𝑎 > 0 implies larger disutility of child labor.   
The modified household production function is  
 𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒) = 𝑘(1 + 𝑒). (17) 
The household maximization problem is now given by 
 
max 
𝑒
𝑢 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘(1 + 𝑒) + 𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒] −
𝑒2
2𝑎
. 
 
Thus, child labor for household 𝑘 is  
 
𝑒∗ =
𝑎(𝑘 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏
. (18) 
As can be seen from Eqs. (5a), (5b) and (5c), child labor increases with 𝑘 (the wealth paradox), 
and decreases with 𝑝 and 𝜏.  In addition, child labor increases with 𝑎.   
The household consumption is rewritten as  
 
𝑐 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘(1 + 𝑒∗ ) + 𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒∗ ]. ’ 
The government budget constraint is  
 
𝜏 ∫ 𝑐
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) = ∫ (𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒∗ )
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘),  
which gives the uniform transfer such as 
 
𝑇 = 𝜏 ∫ 𝑘(1 + 𝑒∗ )𝑑𝐹(𝑘)
𝐾
+ 𝑝 ∫ 𝑒∗
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘)  
 
                              = 𝜏 ∫ 𝑘 [1 +
𝑎(𝑘 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏
] 𝑑𝐹(𝑘)
𝐾
+ 𝑝 ∫
𝑎(𝑘 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘).  
Differentiating 𝑇 with respect to 𝑝, we obtain the marginal benefit as 
 
𝑇𝑝 = −
𝑎𝜏
1 + 𝜏
∫ 𝑘
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) + ∫
𝑎(𝑘 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) −
𝑎𝑝
1 + 𝜏
.  
Denote the average size of land by ?̅?, 
 
?̅? = ∫ 𝑘
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘).  
Then, the marginal benefit is now rewritten as 
 
𝑇𝑝 =
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 2𝑝] = 𝑀𝐵(𝑝). (19) 
Note that 𝑒∗  in Eq. (18) is the marginal cost, 𝑀𝐶(𝑝, 𝑘).  If 𝑘 < (1 − 𝜏)?̅?, there exists a unique 
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𝑝∗ such that 𝑀𝐵(𝑝∗ ) = 𝑀𝐶(𝑝∗ , 𝑘).  The second-order condition is satisfied.  If 𝑘 ≥ (1 − 𝜏)?̅?, 
then 𝑀𝐵(𝑝∗ ) ≤ 𝑀𝐶(𝑝∗ , 𝑘)  for all 𝑝 ≥ 0,  which implies 𝑝∗ = 0 .  This relationship is 
depicted in Fig. 1.   
 
Fig. 1 is here 
 
Formally, using Eqs. (13), (18), and (19), we obtain 
 
𝑝∗ = {
(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 < (1 − 𝜏)?̅? 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 ≥ (1 − 𝜏)?̅?
 (20) 
The relationship between wealth and the preferred index is shown in Fig. 2.  Under the critical 
value(1 − 𝜏)?̅? , this relationship is down sloping, while the preferred index is zero over the 
critical value.   
 
Fig. 2 is here 
 
   The above argument can be summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
Assume that 𝑘𝑚 < (1 − 𝜏)?̅?.  Then, the voting equilibrium is given by 
 𝑝𝑚 = (1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚. (21) 
If 𝑘𝑚 ≥ (1 − 𝜏)?̅?, then the voting equilibrium is 𝑝𝑚 = 0. 
 
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows.  If the median voter is a lower wealth 
household, the amount of child labor will be smaller (from Eq. (18)).  As the wealth of median 
voter becomes greater, child labor increases, potentially resulting in a smaller share of the index.  
Consequently, greater wealth (greater 𝑘𝑚) diminishes the share of index.  Beyond a point, the 
median voter will choose 𝑝∗ = 0, that is, UCT programs.             
   Now we turn to the effects of the wealth inequality on child labor to consider the role of 
conditionality.  For this purpose, we use the following index to measure wealth inequality, 
 ?̅? − 𝑘𝑚
?̅?
.  
From Eq. (21) the preferred index is rewritten as  
 
𝑝𝑚 = ?̅? [
?̅? − 𝑘𝑚
?̅?
− 𝜏]. (22) 
Whether conditionality in cash transfers is attached depends on the median of wealth, 𝑘𝑚, the 
average of wealth, ?̅? , and tax rate, 𝜏 .  Note that the first term on the right-hand side in the 
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square bracket of Eq. (22) represents the wealth inequality index.  An increase in wealth 
inequality reduces child labor since the preferred index 𝑝∗  is decreasing in 𝑘 (from Eq. (20)).    
This proposition suggests that CCTs tends to be preferred in the very unequal countries 
(Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).  Since the key parameters that determine a condition is attached 
to cash transfers are the median of wealth, 𝑘𝑚, the average of wealth, ?̅?, and tax rate, 𝜏, we can 
make the cross-country estimates of the preferred index, 𝑝∗ as explained in section 6.   
   The second term on the right-hand side in the square bracket of Eq. (22) is the tax effect.  
From Eq. (18), we can see that the higher tax rate, the less child labor.  Thus, as the 
redistribution effect through CCTs is small, the preferred index, 𝑝∗ , is diminished. 
 
 
5. Discussions 
In this section, we extend our basic model to investigate whether CT programs may affect child 
labor supply across siblings.  For this purpose, we change our basic model from Section 4 in 
two regards.  First, to analyze the sibling effect on child labor and CT programs, we distinguish 
between farm work and domestic work such as caring for family members.  Second, we 
introduce the heterogeneity of child labor (the age gap between siblings) into our basic model.  
 
5.1 The sibling effect on child labor and CT programs 
As pointed out by Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995, 1997), having a greater number of 
younger siblings implies more child labor.  Thus, the number of younger siblings may affect 
child labor, and thereby the design of the CT programs.  In this regard, we want to clarify this 
theory using our basic model based on the assumption that wealthier individual (more 
landholdings) have a greater number of children.  In this subsection, we consider the different 
types of work performed by children.  In particular, we distinguish the difference between farm 
work and domestic work such as caring for other children.   
Older children’s time spent caring for younger siblings is assumed to 𝜃(𝑘).  Since there are 
more younger siblings as the land is wider, we also assume 𝜃′ (𝑘) > 0． The more children 
there are in the household, the larger the household consumption expenditure.  We also 
assume that the cost of childcare, 𝑐(𝑘), is not taxed (if it is taxed, the results are unchanged).   
   From the above assumption, we can rewrite the household budget constraint (2) as 
 𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒) + ?̃? = (1 + 𝜏)𝑐 + 𝑐(𝑘).  
Then, the utility function is modified by 
 𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑒; 𝑘) = 𝑐 − 𝜙(𝜃(𝑘) + 𝑒).  
The household maximization problem is now given as 
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max 
𝑒
  𝑢 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒) + 𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒 − 𝑐(𝑘)] − 𝜙(𝜃(𝑘) + 𝑒) 
 
 
                                 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘(1 + 𝑒) + 𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒 − 𝑐(𝑘)] −
1
2𝑎
(𝜃(𝑘) + 𝑒)2 . 
 
From the first-order conditions for utility maximization, we have child labor for household 𝑘 as 
 
𝑒∗ =
𝑎(𝑘 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏
− 𝜃(𝑘). (23) 
Comparing this with Eq. (18), we can see that Eq. (23) reduces only the amount of 𝜃(𝑘).   
The household’s consumption is rewritten as 
 
𝑐 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘(1 + 𝑒∗ ) + 𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒∗ − 𝑐(𝑘)].  
The government budget constraint is  
 
𝜏 ∫ 𝑐
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) = ∫ (𝑇 − 𝑝𝑒∗ )
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘),  
which gives 
 
𝑇 = 𝜏 ∫ 𝑘(1 + 𝑒∗ ) − 𝑐(𝑘))𝑑𝐹(𝑘)
𝐾
+ 𝑝 ∫ 𝑒∗
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) = 𝑇(𝑝, 𝜏). (24) 
Thus, the indirect utility function is given as 
 
𝑢∗ =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘(1 + 𝑒∗ ) + 𝑇(𝑝, 𝜏) − 𝑝𝑒∗ − 𝑐(𝑘)] −
1
2𝑎
(𝜃(𝑘) + 𝑒∗ )2 .  
Differentiating 𝑢∗ with respect to 𝑝, we obtain 
 𝜕𝑢∗
𝜕𝑝
=
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘𝑒∗ + 𝑇𝑝 − 𝑒
∗ − 𝑝𝑒𝑝
∗] −
1
𝑎
(𝜃(𝑘) + 𝑒∗ )𝑒𝑝
∗  
 
                                =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑇𝑝 − 𝑒
∗ ].  
Thus, the preferred index for household 𝑘 is satisfied 
 𝑇𝑝 − 𝑒
∗ = 0. (25) 
From Eqs. (23) and (24), we obtain 
 
𝑇𝑝 = 𝜏 ∫ 𝑘𝑒𝑝
∗𝑑𝐹(𝑘)
𝐾
+ ∫ 𝑒∗
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) + 𝑝 ∫ 𝑒𝑝
∗
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘)  
 
                                =
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 2𝑝] − ∫ 𝜃(𝑘)
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘).  
Therefore, Eqs. (23) and (25) yields 
 
𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘 +
1 + 𝜏
𝑎
[𝜃(𝑘) − ∫ 𝜃(𝑘)
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘)]. (26) 
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When the caring time is constant, 𝜃(𝑘) = ?̅?, equation (26) is equal to be 𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘, 
which is the same as the first line of Eq. (20) in our basic model.   
Note that if the cost of childcare depends on the number of children (the amount of land), 
the preferred index is different from the one in our basic model.  To clarify this point, we 
assume 𝜃(𝑘) = 𝜃𝑘.  In this specification, 𝜃 can be interpreted as additional time spent on 
domestic work.  This means that when 𝜃 is higher, older children spent more time caring for 
younger siblings.   
From Eq. (26), we obtain 
 
𝑝∗ = (1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘 +
1 + 𝜏
𝑎
𝜃(𝑘 − ?̅?)  
 
                                                = (
1 + 𝜏
𝑎
𝜃 − 1) (𝑘 − ?̅?) − 𝜏?̅?. (27) 
When the horizontal axis indicates wealth (landholdings), 𝑘, and the vertical axis indicates the 
preferred index, 𝑝∗ , equation Eq. (27) can be depicted on the (𝑘, 𝑝∗ ) plane.  This relationship 
is depicted in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3 is here 
 
Eq. (27) is a downward sloping straight line with slope (1 + 𝜏)𝜃/𝑎 − 1 and always passes the 
point (?̅?, −𝜏?̅?).  Considering 𝑝∗ ≥ 0, we have 
 
𝑝∗ = {
(
1 + 𝜏
𝑎
𝜃 − 1) (𝑘 − ?̅?) − 𝜏?̅? 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 < ?̃? 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑘 ≥ ?̃?
 (28) 
where 
 
 ?̃? = (1 −
𝜏
1 −
1 + 𝜏
𝑎 𝜃
) ?̅?. (29) 
If 𝜃 = 0, then ?̃? = (1 − 𝜏)?̅?, and Eq. (28) is the same as the first line of Eq. (20).  Assuming 
that 𝜃 increases from zero, the slope of Eq. (28) declines past the point (?̅?, −𝜏?̅?).  Thus, for the 
household 𝑘 < ?̃?,  
 𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝜃
< 0.  
is satisfied.  This result means that the more younger siblings in the household, the smaller the 
index supported for a landless household, that is, landless household tends to prefer to UCT 
programs.   
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Fig. 4 is here 
 
   The intuition behind this result is as follows.  Like our basic model presented in Section2, 
the marginal benefit (MB) of increasing the index share, 𝑝, is  𝑇𝑝  and the marginal cost (MC) 
is  𝑒∗ .  From Eq. (23), we can see that the MC declines by the amount of 𝜃𝑘 when 𝜃(𝑘) = 𝜃𝑘.  
On the other hand, the MB also declines by the amount of 𝜃?̅? .  Note that, for the landless 
households, 𝜃𝑘 < 𝜃?̅?  is satisfied.  In other words, the negative effect of reducing the MB 
dominated the positive effect of a decrease in the MC (see, Fig. 4).  Thus, a smaller share of the 
index is supported by landless household.   
In contrast, land-rich households have incentives to support a larger share of the index due 
to the larger positive effect from the decrease in MC.  However, as it binds  𝑝∗ ≥ 0 and their 
opinions are not reflected through their voting decision, their vote does not affect the voting 
equilibrium.  Therefore, we have the following proposition,  
 
Proposition 2.   
Assume that 𝜃(𝑘) = 𝜃𝑘.  If 𝑘𝑚  < ?̃?, then the voting equilibrium is given by 
 
𝑝𝑚 = (
1 + 𝜏
𝑎
𝜃 − 1) (𝑘𝑚 − ?̅?) − 𝜏?̅?. (30) 
If 𝑘𝑚 > ?̃?, the voting equilibrium is 𝑝𝑚 = 0. 
 
Now, we focus on the effects on the equilibrium amount of child labor.  Making use of Eqs. (25) 
and (30), we can rewrite Eq. (23) as 
 
𝑒∗ (𝑘, 𝜏, 𝜃) =
𝑎[𝑘 − 𝑝𝑚(𝑘, 𝜏, 𝜃)]
1 + 𝜏
− 𝜃𝑘. (31) 
The effect on the equilibrium amount of child labor of additional time spent on domestic work 
can be interpreted as follows.  From the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (31), we can see 
that an increase in 𝜃  leads to more work on the family farm thorough a decrease in the 
preferred index.  Since the government imposes a penalty only for child farm work, when this 
penalty is small, poor parents may have their children work more on the family farm.  On the 
other hand, from the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (31), an increase in 𝜃 declines 
the equilibrium amount of child labor.  Then, the overall effect on the equilibrium amount child 
labor is ambiguous, depending on the relative magnitudes of these two effects.  The 
equilibrium amount of child labor can be further rewritten as 
 
𝑒∗ (𝑘, 𝜏, 𝜃) =
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
{𝑘 − (
1 + 𝜏
𝑎
𝜃 − 1) (𝑘𝑚 − ?̅?) − 𝜏?̅?} − 𝜃𝑘. (32) 
From Eq. (32), we can drive the following corollary: 
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Corollary 1.  
(i) when 𝑘 < ?̅? − 𝑘𝑚, 𝜕𝑒∗ 𝜕𝜃 > 0⁄ . 
(ii) when 𝑘 > ?̅? − 𝑘𝑚, 𝜕𝑒∗ 𝜕𝜃 < 0⁄ . 
 
The intuition behind this corollary can be explained as follows.  For land-poor households, 
when older siblings spend more time engaged in domestic work, the majority tend to support 
UCT programs (𝜕𝑝∗ 𝜕𝜃 < 0⁄ ).  As a result, for poor countries, the introduction of CT programs 
may provide an incentive for land-poor households to have their children work more on the 
family farm.  This theoretical result is consistent with empirical evidences of Edmonds (2006, 
p.817, p.819), who observed both males and females work more in the presence of younger male 
siblings.  As household size increases, the extra work associated with being an older girl 
increases significantly.  Most of this additional work for girls comes from spending additional 
time in domestic activities such as childminding, cooking, and cleaning.  This corollary also 
suggests that there is no substitution within the household of younger for older siblings in 
domestic work, as pointed out by Dammert (2010), who found the relevance of domestic work 
and gender differentials in children’s allocation of time in Nicaragua and Guatemala.   
   In contrast, as they have greater wealth, more time spent on domestic work leads to less farm 
work, which is substitutable for domestic work.  In this case, the negative domestic child labor 
effect exceeds the positive farm child labor effects.    
       
5.2 Heterogenous child labor 
We next introduce the heterogeneity of labor efficiency into our basic model.  We assume that 
each parent has two children who have different levels child labor efficiency; one child has a 
higher marginal product in household production than the other.  This assumption of 
comparative advantage in household production is consistent with findings by Edmonds (2007), 
who argued that working older siblings may provide additional labor services to the household, 
which lowers the productivity of younger siblings.  In this setting we show that the lower the 
labor efficiency of one child, the lower the share of preferred index.  Therefore, households with 
lower productivity of younger siblings tend to support the UCT programs.    
The household budget constraint is rewritten as 
 𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒1 + 𝜀𝑒2 ) + ?̃? = (1 + 𝜏)𝑐 + 𝑐(𝑘),  
where 𝑒𝑖  is the working time of child 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2); the labor efficiency of child 2 is 𝜀 ≤ 1.  This 
assumption means that we can interpret one child as having a comparative advantage in 
household production compared to the other.  As pointed out by Edmonds (2006), the 
existence of household production implies that the age and sex composition of siblings affects a 
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child’s labor supply.  𝑐(𝑘) is the cost of childcare (not taxed).  
The utility function is now   
 𝑢 = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑒) = 𝑐 − 𝜙(𝑒1 ) − 𝜙(𝑒2 ).  
We assume that parents consider leisure as a luxury good for each child and that they know the 
labor efficiency of each child.   
   Instead of the specification in Eq. (3), the CT program is modified as 
 ?̃? = 𝑇 − 𝑝(𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ).  
The household maximization problem is 
 
max
𝑒
  𝑢 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑓(𝑘, 1 + 𝑒1 + 𝜀𝑒2 ) + 𝑇 − 𝑝(𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ) − 𝑐(𝑘)] − 𝜙(𝑒1 ) − 𝜙(𝑒2 ) 
 
 
               =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘(1 + 𝑒1 + 𝜀𝑒2 ) + 𝑇 − 𝑝(𝑒1 + 𝑒2 ) − 𝑐(𝑘)] −
1
2𝑎
(𝑒1 )
2
−
1
2𝑎
(𝑒2 )
2
 
 
The first-order conditions require 
 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑒1
=
𝑘 − 𝑝
1 + 𝜏
−
𝑒1
𝑎
= 0, 
 
 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑒2
=
𝑘𝜀 − 𝑝
1 + 𝜏
−
𝑒2
𝑎
= 0. 
 
which gives child labor as 
 
𝑒1
∗ =
𝑎(𝑘 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏
, (33a) 
 
𝑒2
∗ =
𝑎(𝑘𝜀 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏
. (33b) 
The household consumption is given by 
 
𝑐 =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘(1 + 𝑒1
∗ + 𝜀𝑒2
∗) + 𝑇 − 𝑝(𝑒1
∗ + 𝑒2
∗) − 𝑐(𝑘)].  
The government budget constraint is  
 
𝜏 ∫ 𝑐
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) = ∫ ?̃?
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘).  
Substituting household consumption and the CT program into the government budget 
constraint, we obtain the uniform transfer as a function of (𝑝, 𝜏), 
 
𝑇 = 𝜏 ∫ [𝑘(1 + 𝑒1
∗ + 𝜀𝑒2
∗) − 𝑐(𝑘)]𝑑𝐹(𝑘)
𝐾
+ 𝑝 ∫ (𝑒1
∗ + 𝑒2
∗)
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) = 𝑇(𝑝, 𝜏).  
Then, the indirect utility function of household 𝑘 is rewritten as   
 
𝑢∗ =
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑘(1 + 𝑒1
∗ + 𝜀𝑒2
∗) + 𝑇(𝑝, 𝜏) − 𝑝(𝑒1
∗ + 𝑒2
∗) − 𝑐(𝑘)] −
1
2𝑎
(𝑒1 )
2
−
1
2𝑎
(𝑒2 )
2
. 
Differentiating 𝑢∗  with respect to 𝑝, and using the first-order conditions, we obtain 
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 𝜕𝑢∗
𝜕𝑝
=
1
1 + 𝜏
[𝑇𝑝 (𝑝, 𝜏) − (𝑒1
∗ + 𝑒2
∗)].  
Therefore, the preferred index for household 𝑘, denoted by 𝑝∗ = 𝑝(𝑝, 𝜏) is given by 
 𝑇𝑝 (𝑝, 𝜏) = 𝑒1
∗(𝑘, 𝑝∗ , 𝜏) + 𝑒2
∗(𝑘, 𝑝∗ , 𝜏).  
The marginal benefit is now   
 
𝑇𝑝 = 𝜏 ∫ 𝑘(𝑒1𝑝
∗ + 𝑒2𝑝
∗ )𝑑𝐹(𝑘)
𝐾
+ ∫ (𝑒1
∗ + 𝑒2
∗)
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) + 𝑝 ∫ (𝑒1𝑝
∗ + 𝑒2𝑝
∗ )
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘)  
 
   = 𝜏 ∫ 𝑘 [(−
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
) + 𝜀 (−
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
)] 𝑑𝐹(𝑘)
𝐾
1
1 + 𝜏
+ ∫ [(
𝑎(𝑘 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏
) + (
𝑎(𝑘𝜀 − 𝑝)
1 + 𝜏
)]
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) 
+𝑝 ∫ 𝑘 [(−
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
) + 𝜀 (−
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
)]
𝐾
𝑑𝐹(𝑘) 
 
        =
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
[(1 + 𝜀)(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 4𝑝] = 𝑀𝐵(𝑝, 𝜀). 
The marginal cost is 
 
𝑒1
∗ + 𝑒2
∗ =
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
[(1 + 𝜀)𝑘 − 2𝑝] = 𝑀𝐶(𝑝, 𝜀).  
When the horizontal axis indicates the preferred index, 𝑝∗ , and the vertical axis indicates the 
marginal benefit and the marginal cost, if 𝑘 < (1 − 𝜏)?̅? is satisfied, there is an intersection 
between 𝑀𝐵(𝑝, 𝜀) and 𝑀𝐶(𝑝, 𝜀) .  To the left of intersection point, 𝑀𝐵 >  𝑀𝐶 is satisfied, 
and to the right of intersection point, 𝑀𝐵 <  𝑀𝐶  is satisfied.  Then, household utility is 
maximized at the intersection point,  𝑝∗ .  Solving 𝑀𝐵(𝑝, 𝜀) = 𝑀𝐶(𝑝, 𝜀), we obtain  
 
𝑝∗ =
1
2
(1 + 𝜀)[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘]. (34) 
If 𝑘 ≥ (1 − 𝜏)?̅?, it satisfied 𝑀𝐵(𝑝, 𝜀) ≥ 𝑀𝐶(𝑝, 𝜀) for all 𝑝, then 𝑝∗ = 0．This relationship is 
depicted in Fig. 5.   
 
Fig. 5 is here 
 
   When the siblings have the same labor efficiency (𝜀 = 1), Eq. (34) is equal to the first line of 
Eq. (20) in our basic model.  When the siblings have the different labor efficiency (𝜀 < 1), the 
preferred index for household 𝑘 is lower.  This reason is as follows.  A decrease in labor 
efficiency induces the marginal benefit to shift downward by 𝑎(1 − 𝜏)?̅? (1 + 𝜏)⁄  .  Thus, the 
intersection point shifts to the left.  On the other hand, the marginal cost shifts downward by 
𝑎𝑘 (1 + 𝜏)⁄ .  Thus, the intersection point shifts to the right.  Overall, whether the intersection 
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point shifts to the right or left depends on the slope of the marginal benefit and marginal cost.  
In the light of absolute value, the slope of the marginal benefit is greater than that of the marginal 
cost.  Hence, the intersection point shifts to the left because the negative effect of the reduction 
in marginal benefit dominates the positive effect of the reduction of marginal cost (see, Fig. 5).   
   Summarizing the above, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.   
Assume that 𝑘𝑚 ≤ (1 − 𝜏)?̅?.  Then, the voting equilibrium is given by 
 
𝑝𝑚 =
1
2
(1 + 𝜀)[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚]. (35) 
𝑝𝑚 is positively related to the sibling’s labor productivity, 𝜀.  If 𝑘𝑚 > (1 − 𝜏)?̅?, then 𝑝𝑚 = 0. 
 
Now we turn to the effects on the equilibrium amount of child labor.  Substituting Eqs. (33a) 
and (33b) into Eq. (35), the equilibrium amount of child labor among siblings is rewritten as  
 
𝑒1
∗(𝑘𝑚, 𝜏, 𝜀) =
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
{𝑘 −
1
2
(1 + 𝜀)[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚]}, (36a) 
 
𝑒2
∗(𝑘𝑚, 𝜏, 𝜀) =
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
{𝜀𝑘 −
1
2
(1 + 𝜀)[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚]}. (36b) 
From Eq. (36a), we have the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 2.  
A narrowing age gap leads to a reduction in the amount of older children’s work.  
 
In this subsection, the sibling’s labor productivity, 𝜀 , is of central interest.  𝜀  can also be 
interpreted as the age gap between siblings, and an increase in 𝜀  means that the age gap 
narrows.  Note that, from Eq. (36a), when the age gap becomes smaller, the amount of older 
children’s child labor is reduced through the effects of an increase in the share of the index.  
This theoretical result is consistent with empirical evidences of Edmonds (2006, p.816), who 
found both older males and older females have to work less as the age gap decreases.   
In contrast, the effect of the narrowed age gap on child labor of the younger sibling is 
ambiguous.  The amount of total child labor is  
 
𝑒1
∗ + 𝑒2
∗ =
𝑎
1 + 𝜏
{(1 + 𝜀)𝑘 − (1 + 𝜀)[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚]}  
 
                                        =
𝑎(1 + 𝜀)
1 + 𝜏
{𝑘 − [(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚]}. (37) 
From Eqs. (36b) and (37), we can drive the following corollary: 
20 
 
 
Corollary 3.  
(i) when 𝑘 <
1
2
[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚], 𝜕𝑒2
∗ ∂𝜀 < 0⁄  and 𝜕(𝑒1
∗+𝑒2
∗) ∂𝜀 < 0⁄  
(ii) when 
1
2
[(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚] < 𝑘 < [(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚], 𝜕𝑒2
∗ ∂𝜀 > 0⁄  and 𝜕(𝑒1
∗+𝑒2
∗) ∂𝜀 < 0⁄ . 
(iii) when 𝑘 > [(1 − 𝜏)?̅? − 𝑘𝑚], 𝜕𝑒2
∗ ∂𝜀 > 0⁄  and 𝜕(𝑒1
∗+𝑒2
∗) ∂𝜀 > 0⁄  
 
The intuition behind this corollary can be explained as follows.  When a household’s wealth is 
smaller enough, a narrowed age gap leads to support CCT programs by the majority (from Eq. 
(35)).  From Eq. (36b), we can see that the effect of CT programs dominates the wealth effect.  
As a result, for poor countries, the introduction of CT programs may decrease both the total 
amount of child labor and the labor of the younger sibling.  This result is consistent with 
findings by Edmonds (2006, p.819), who demonstrated that for small age gaps, a subsequent 
female sibling is associated with less additional work for both boys and girls in both market and 
domestic work.  Another finding is a program in Cambodia by Ferreira et al., (2017), who 
argued that CCTs have a negative displacement effect on siblings.13  They also pointed out that 
this ambiguity arises from the interaction of a positive income effect with a negative 
displacement effect.  In our model, we could explain this result for the wealth heterogeneity 
(landholdings).   
As the household’s wealth is larger, a decrease in the age gap induces an increase in the 
amount of younger children’s child labor.   
    
 
6. Calibrations 
So far we have focused on the design of CT programs (conditional or unconditional), which is 
decided through a political process.  As pointed out in the Introduction, Gaarder (2014), among 
others argued that while most CT programs in Latin America are conditional, the majority of 
them in sub-Saharan Africa are unconditional.  Using our model, we try to explain why these 
distinctions occur in developing and transition economies.  From equation (22), we can find 
the key parameters that determine whether a condition is attached to cash transfers are the 
median of wealth, 𝑘𝑚 , the average of wealth, ?̅? and tax rate, 𝜏 .14  Then we first obtain the 
                                                                
13 So far, as Fiszbein and Schady (2009, p.116) pointed out, CT programs could potentially have 
positive or negative spillovers for other siblings: positive if the income effect reduces child work 
for all children; negative if parents compensate for the reduction in the work of one child by 
increasing the work of other sibling in many developing countries.  Recently, Ferreira et al., 
(2017) added to the third effect as a negative displacement effect that CT programs might lead 
parents to reallocate child work away from the recipient and to other children in the household.    
14 In this section, we assume away the tax rate, 𝜏, although we can use the tax data such as the 
2018 World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank, because many countries 
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cross-country estimates of the preferred index, 𝑝𝑚.  Our result confirms that a number of 
countries with a greater wealth inequality adopt conditional cash transfers in developing and 
transition economies.   
   The median and mean wealth data are both obtained from Davies et al., (2017), who 
provided the estimates of the global distribution of wealth for the period 2000-2014.15  The 
Credit Suisse Research Institute (2010, p.95) argued that when we look at the relative 
importance of financial versus non-financial assets in the average household portfolio, especially, 
in developing countries, it is not unusual for 80% or more of total assets to be held in the form 
of non-financial assets, including farms, and small business assets.  This pattern is also 
associated with the relative under-development of financial institutions in many lower income 
countries.  The countries that introduced CCTs are from Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and World 
Bank (2015) and, the other countries, including those adopting UCTs, are from Garcia et al., 
(2011) and World Bank (2015).  From those countries and the data obtained from Davies et al., 
(2017), we focus on those with a population of more than one million, and a mean wealth of less 
than 30,000 USD.  There are 52 countries with CCTs (see Table 1) and 36 other countries, 
including those adopting UCTs (see Table 2).   
 
Table 1. and Table 2. are Here. 
 
Fig. 6 plots the inequality index among CCTs and other countries, including those adopting UCTs, 
against the mean wealth of less than 30,000 USD used in Table 1 and Table 2.  From observing 
that the differences between CCTs and other countries appears through the inequality index 
using both the median and mean wealth, we can confirm that a number of countries with greater 
wealth inequality tend to adopt conditional cash transfers in developing and transition 
economies.   
 
Fig. 6. is Here.  
 
In this section, we explore whether there is any significant difference between CCTs and other 
countries (including those adopting UCTs).  Between-group comparisons (i.e., CCTs and other 
countries) were assessed using independent t-tests.   
                                                                
that implement both CCTs and UCTs are supported and promoted by multilateral banks, such as 
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.  In the African case, international 
donors such as DFID and UNICEF also have played a more central role (Gaarder, 2014).              
15 Davies et al., (2017) define the distribution of net worth within and across nations as the 
market value of financial assets plus non-financial assets (principally housing and land) less 
debts.  Private pension wealth is included, but public pensions are not. 
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Table 3. is Here.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of independent t-tests used to compare the data.  An 
independent t-test revealed a significant difference between groups (𝑝 = 0.00060916).  This 
result shows that there is a different in the inequality index between the two groups.  
  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the role of conditionality in the choice between CCTs and UCTs for CT 
programs to eliminate child labor.  We consider an overlapping generations model à la Basu et 
al., (2010), who demonstrated the inverted-U relationship between wealth (especially 
landholding) and child labor.  We show that when wealth inequality is high, CCTs tend to be 
supported by median voters, and child labor is reduced.  In contrast, UCTs tend to have political 
support when there is little wealth inequality across individuals, but child labor prevails.  Our 
cross-country estimation confirmed that a number of countries with greater wealth inequality 
tend to adopt CCTs in developing and transition economies.  We also examine whether 
attaching condition to cash transfers generates sibling differences in child labor.      
   We have not considered the inequality-growth relationship in the choice between CCTs and 
UCTs for CT programs.  As pointed out by Barrientos and DeJong (2006), one of the main aims 
of the CT programs is to enhance investment in human capital.  We also assume away the role 
of education and health component to focus on the “wealth paradox”, as noted in Basu et al., 
(2010).  Many studies on CCTs shed light on the specific behavior of the beneficiary households 
such as school enrolment and attendance of children, regular use of primary health care by 
mothers and infants.  These and other possible improvement in this paper are subjects for 
future research. 
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Fig. 3. The preferred index as a function of land holding (sibling effect) 
 
Fig. 4. Sibling effect of the preferred index 
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Fig. 5. Age gap effect of the preferred index 
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Fig. 6. Wealth Inequality among countries with CCTs and other countries  
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Table 1.  Countries with CCTs  
 
CCT52 
Countries Income  
Group 
Transfer  
Type 
Wealth 
mean 
(USD) 
Wealth 
median 
(USD) 
Inequality Index  
(not tax-adjusted) 
  
  
a b 1-b/a 
Angola UM CCT UCT 14,959 3,054 0.7958419680 
Argentina UM CCT UCT 21,401 6,251 0.7079108453 
Bangladesh L CCT UCT 2,120 624 0.7056603774 
Benin L CCT UCT 3,251 987 0.6964011074 
Bolivia LM CCT UCT 5,033 1,424 0.7170673555 
Brazil UM CCT UCT 19,973 4,442 0.7775997597 
Burkina Faso L CCT UCT 1,341 360 0.7315436242 
Cambodia L CCT 
 
3,010 835 0.7225913621 
Cameroon LM CCT 
 
2,637 785 0.7023132347 
Chad L CCT UCT 1,073 326 0.6961789376 
China UM CCT UCT 22,753 5,065 0.7773919923 
Colombia UM CCT UCT 22,634 6,746 0.7019528144 
Congo, Rep. LM CCT UCT 3,724 1,066 0.7137486574 
Costa Rica UM CCT UCT 28,708 10,172 0.6456736798 
Ecuador UM CCT UCT 13,222 4,302 0.6746331871 
El Salvador LM CCT UCT 12,965 4,851 0.6258387968 
Eritrea L CCT 
 
2,294 649 0.7170880558 
Ghana LM CCT 
 
2,909 10 0.9965623926 
Gambia, The L CCT UCT 793 169 0.7868852459 
Haiti L CCT UCT 3,787 419 0.8893583311 
India LM CCT UCT 3,918 660 0.8315467075 
Indonesia LM CCT UCT 10,818 2,179 0.7985764467 
Jamaica UM CCT UCT 10,559 3,270 0.6903115825 
Kazakhstan UM CCT UCT 7,054 1,077 0.8473206691 
Kenya L CCT UCT 2,112 502 0.7623106061 
Lesotho LM CCT UCT 3,395 821 0.7581737850 
Macedonia, FYR UM CCT UCT 10,396 4,776 0.5405925356 
Madagascar L CCT UCT 413 125 0.6973365617 
Malawi L CCT UCT 159 40 0.7484276730 
Mali L CCT UCT 987 355 0.6403242148 
Mexico UM CCT UCT 25,046 7,385 0.7051425377 
Morocco LM CCT UCT 11,247 3,161 0.7189472748 
Mozambique L CCT UCT 845 193 0.7715976331 
Namibia UM CCT UCT 16,586 1,615 0.9026287230 
Nicaragua LM CCT UCT 3,424 1,072 0.6869158879 
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   Sources: The data on CCT programs are from Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and the World Bank 
(2015).   The median and mean wealth data are obtained from Davies et al., (2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Niger L CCT UCT 993 333 0.6646525680 
Nigeria LM CCT UCT 3,026 684 0.7739590218 
Pakistan LM CCT UCT 4,623 1,829 0.6043694571 
Panama UM CCT UCT 23,475 7,036 0.7002768903 
Paraguay LM CCT UCT 11,550 3,436 0.7025108225 
Peru UM CCT UCT 26,486 6,624 0.7499056105 
Philippines LM CCT UCT 9,903 2,211 0.7767343229 
Romania UM CCT UCT 14,091 5,424 0.6150734511 
Senegal LM CCT UCT 2,612 851 0.6741960184 
Sri Lanka LM CCT UCT 5,262 1,443 0.7257696693 
Tajikistan L CCT UCT 3,088 1,290 0.5822538860 
Tanzania L CCT UCT 1,009 386 0.6174430129 
Togo L CCT UCT 2,441 673 0.7242933224 
Turkey UM CCT UCT 24,381 5,557 0.7720766170 
Vietnam LM CCT UCT 5,255 1,824 0.6529019981 
Yemen, Rep. LM CCT UCT 5,290 1,995 0.6228733459 
Zambia LM CCT UCT 1,676 83 0.9504773270 
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Table 2. Other countries, including those adopting UCTs  
 
Others 36 
Countries Income 
Group 
Transfer 
Type 
Wealth 
mean 
(USD) 
Wealth 
median 
(USD) 
Inequality Index 
(not tax-adjusted) 
    
 
a b 1-b/a 
Albania UM 
  
9,948 3,648 0.6332931242 
Armenia LM 
 
UCT 3,915 651 0.8337164751 
Azerbaijan UM 
 
UCT 15,152 6,200 0.5908130940 
Belarus UM 
 
UCT 2,992 833 0.7215909091 
Bosnia and Herzegovina UM 
 
UCT 2,120 811 0.6174528302 
Botswana UM 
 
UCT 1,099 371 0.6624203822 
Bulgaria UM 
 
UCT 5,207 1,919 0.6314576532 
Burundi L 
 
UCT 3,559 1,663 0.5327339140 
Central African Republic L 
 
UCT 2,253 791 0.6489125610 
Congo, Dem. Rep. L 
 
UCT 6,374 2,634 0.5867587072 
Cote d’Ivoire LM 
 
UCT 21,251 7,396 0.6519693191 
Egypt, Arab Rep. LM 
 
UCT 4,989 2,023 0.5945079174 
Ethiopia L 
  
5,996 2,106 0.6487658439 
Gabon UM 
  
8,030 286 0.9643835616 
Guinea-Bissau L 
 
UCT 345 126 0.6347826087 
Iraq UM 
 
UCT 755 108 0.8569536424 
Jordan UM 
 
UCT 3,514 991 0.7179852020 
Liberia L 
 
UCT 2,033 729 0.6414166257 
Malaysia UM 
  
825 152 0.8157575758 
Mauritania LM 
 
UCT 740 259 0.6500000000 
Moldova LM 
 
UCT 364 103 0.7170329670 
Mongolia LM 
 
UCT 438 196 0.5525114155 
Myanmar L 
  
14,726 5,090 0.6543528453 
Nepal L 
  
24,867 9,020 0.6372702779 
Papua New Guinea LM 
 
UCT 14,476 6,613 0.5431749102 
Sierra Leone L 
 
UCT 19,419 10,986 0.4342654102 
South Africa UM 
 
UCT 19,600 7,482 0.6182653061 
Sudan LM 
 
UCT 28,076 7,347 0.7383174241 
Swaziland LM 
 
UCT 6,745 1,602 0.8337164751 
Syrian Arab Republic LM 
 
UCT 4,382 1,302 0.7028753994 
Thailand UM 
  
9,221 3,704 0.5983082095 
Tunisia UM 
 
UCT 15,408 5,963 0.6129932503 
Ukraine LM 
 
UCT 6,837 3,517 0.4855930964 
Venezuela, RB UM 
 
UCT 16,319 8,354 0.4880813775 
West Bank and Gaza LM 
 
UCT 22,756 10,804 0.5252241167 
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Zimbabwe L 
 
UCT 19,178 6,289 0.6720721660 
    Sources:  The data of other countries, including those adopting UCTs, are from Garcia et al., 
(2011) and World Bank (2015).   The median and mean wealth data are obtained from Davies 
et al., (2017). 
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Table 3. Independent t-test analysis of differences 
 
 
 
 N Mean SD t-value p-value 
CCT 52 0.726772344 
 
0.007668594 
 
1.987934206 
 
0.00060916 
 
Others 36 0.651381294 
 
0.01228244 
 
 
 
 
